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Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each
time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to
this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of utility then mar-
ket occupancies become inhomogeneous with preference given to this market where the
fluctuation occured first. There exists a critical size of agent population above which
agents on bigger market behave collectively. In this regime there always exists a history
of decisions for which all agents on a bigger market react identically.
Keywords: Minority game, adaptive system.
1. Introduction
Minority game (MG) is a model of adaptive behavior in multi-agent systems where
being in minority is profitable [1]. Each agent can individually adapt to variable state
of the system by updating its choice algorithms, called strategies. This adaptation
can be done using data from the sequence of recent winning decisions. Strategies
are ranked every time by evaluating their utilities, dependent on the integrated
population actions, such that the best strategy can be chosen.
The MG was originally formulated [2, 3] for one public sequence µ of winning
minority decisions. There was also one binary choice set, available for each agent,
and actions were defined on the same set of events. Overall demand, being a sum
of individual actions, was calculated for the whole set of agents. Using analogy to
bargain on a stock exchange, where actions are interpreted as sell or buy, we call
such game a single-market minority game (SMG).
Observing real financial markets one immediately finds that large numbers of
investors use to act concurrently on many markets, usually different in size, decid-
ing not only on their sell/buy actions but, first of all, choosing the market. This
naturally motivates to generalize the original minority game in order to account
1
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Fig. 1. Representation of MMG where each agent (black point) is linked to the market (white
point) where it acts.
for such multi-market agent activity and call it the multi-market minority game
(MMG). The MMG can be visualized as in Fig. 1, where the open symbols refer to
markets, the black ones to agents and link between an agent and a market repre-
sents enablement of the agent to play on this market. If the agent actually acts on
the market the corresponding link is called active.
In this paper, among other things, we are particularly interested in distribution
of market occupancies and its time evolution. In many network systems it is observed
[10] that a small number of nodes absorbs majority of active links. We can see the
similar phenomenon in the MMG where significant differences between numbers of
agents acting on different markets arise in course of the game. Further in the paper
we call this phenomenon the breakdown of the symmetry of choice.
2. Formal definition of the game
The MMG consists of N agents and K markets. At each time step t, the n-th agent
(n = 1, . . . , N) chooses a preferable market kn(t) ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and takes action
an(t) ∈ {−1, 1} on this market. For each market k an aggregated demand is defined
Ak(t) =
Nk(t)∑
n=1
an(t), (1)
where Nk(t) is the number of agents who chose market k at time t. The Ak(t) is
thus the difference between numbers of agents who choose the +1 and −1 actions.
Agents do not know each other’s actions but Ak(t) is known to all agents on the
market. For each market k the minority action is determined
a∗k(t) = − sgnAk(t). (2)
Each agent’s memory is limited to m most recent winning decisions.
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Each agent has the same number s ≥ 2 of devices, called strategies, per market,
altogetherK ·s strategies per agent. Strategies are used to predict the next minority
action a∗k(t + 1). The strategy of the n-th agent, αn, is a function mapping the
sequence µ of last m winning decisions to this agent’s action an. Since for each
market there is P = 2m possible realizations of µk, there is 2
P possible strategies
per market. At the beginning of the game each agent randomly draws s strategies for
each ofK markets, according to a given distribution function ρ(n, k) : N×K → ∆kn,
where ∆kn is a set consisting of s strategies. For clarity, we give the flow chart of the
game in Appendix A, where the processes of generation of the memory pools and
taking decisions by agents are better illustrated.
Each strategy αn, belonging to any of sets ∆
k
n, is given a real-valued function
Uαn which quantifies the utility of the strategy: the more preferable strategy, the
higher utility it has. Strategies with higher utilities are more likely chosen by agents.
There are various choice policies. In the popular greedy policy each agent selects
the strategy of the highest utility
αn(t) = arg max
αn∈{∆1n,...,∆
k
n
}
Uαn(t). (3)
The strategy (3) used by the agent is called the active strategy, in contrast to passive
strategies unused at given moment. At given time an agent acts only on one market
related to the active strategy. However, every time it evaluates all its strategies,
active and passive ones. Each strategy αn is given the payoff related to its action
aαn
Rαn(t) = −aαn(t) g[A(t)], (4)
where g is an odd function, e.g. g(x) = sgn(x) [3]. Other choices are g(x) = x/N or
g(x) = x, the latter used in the present work. The learning process corresponds to
updating the utility for each strategy
Uαn(t+ 1) = Uαn(t) +Rαn(t) (5)
such that each agent knows how good its strategies are.
3. Network structure
We distinguish two types of markets: the regular where all N agents can choose
any market, and irregular one where N1 agents can play only on one market and
remaining N2 = N −N1 agents can choose both (cf. Fig. 2).
At any time, agents connected to more than one market have to choose only
one of them to act. Sets of strategies for markets and lengths of memories m do not
change during the game. These two network structures are sufficient to demonstrate
the phenomenon of the asymmetry of choice and its universality. In particular, we
observe that the phenomenon does not depend on the structure and is present for
both topologies. Irregular topology is more general and better reflects reality where
numbers of agents playing on different markets may not be the same.
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Fig. 2. The regular (left) and irregular (right) market structures. Full lines correspond to agent
(black points) links to the first market (white points) and dashed ones to the second market.
In this paper the MMG on two markets is studied in detail but we discuss also
briefly the three-market case.
4. Relation to other models
The MMG was first discussed by the authors of ref. [4] and developed subsequently
[5]. The authors study in detail the rules used by each agent when switching between
markets, and how the agent’s performance depends on these rules. Performance of
agents is measured by the volatility, i.e. the variance of the aggregate demand nor-
malized to the number of agents, for various schemes. It is found that the volatilities
qualitatively behave similarly for all considered schemes. However, the overall levels
of volatility differ for different switching schemes. In particular, the volatility in the
virtual scores scheme where the highest-utility strategy is chosen, is relatively higher
than in the other schemes in the cooperation mode [5]. This switching scheme was
used in the present paper. Summarizing, our model coincides with the model of ref.
[5] with the virtual scores scheme. They exhibit the following features:
(1) Individuals can choose a market from a set of markets of different size.
(2) Each agent has at least two strategies per market.
(3) The choice of the market and the action on it are preceded by the analysis of
the self-generated information pattern µ.
(4) The strategy space is not reduced.
As a result, such MMG represents a direct extension to the classical MG. It is
important to notice that the analysis in ref. [5] was performed in the cooperation
regime of the game. Therefore the authors could not observe the phenomenon of
breaking the symmetry of choice which shows up in the herd regime and is found
and explained in our research, as described below.
Other known extentions to the classical MG formulate the multi-choice [7] or the
multi-asset MGs with one [8] or more [9] strategies per asset. The authors of ref. [8]
also observe the breakdown of the symmetry of choice but using different kind of
model. They assume that public information pattern µ is chosen randomly and
independently, and with uniform probability, from the artificially created pool of
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information patterns for each asset. A distinct feature of that MMG is an artificially
introduced asymmetry of sizes of µ pools for each asset. This means that their MMG
cannot use the history of the real past winning decisions because in such a case
one could generate a history µ not included in the reduced pool. Consequently, the
history µ has to be chosen randomly from the reduced sets for each asset and for each
time step. The dynamical character of the game is then limited only to the strategy
score. In our opinion, this change distracts the model from the original idea of the
MG, whereas our model is a more straightforward extension of the genuine MG.
This modification, viz. the artificial asymmetry of the µ pools, is responsible for the
market split observed in ref. [8]. Therefore the symmetry breaking observed in ref.
[8] is not a spontaneous one, contrary to our model where the sizes of information
pools are equal. To be more specific, we recall the notation used by the authors of
ref. [8] who define two memory pools µ± and ratios α± of their sizes to the number
of agents
µ± ∈ {1, . . . , P±},
α± = P±/N, (6)
where P± stand for sizes of these pools. These sizes are not necessarily maximal, i.e.
they may be smaller than 2m. This naturally limits the choice set and violates the
symmetry of choice in case α+ 6= α− just because of unequal sizes of µ+ and µ−.
Contrary to that, in our model there is always α+ = α− and µ± are maximal, i.e.
P+ = P− = 2
m. In this case the authors of ref. [8] do not observe any asymmetry
but we do. Our present paper aims to explain why in certain circumstances markets
behave asymmetrically despite α+ = α−.
5. Asymmetry of choice
5.1. Regular markets
After performing numerical simulation for the regular markets we plot the kth
market occupancy Ok(t), defined as the number of agents acting on this market at
given time, and the kth market demand Ak(t), for three total agent populations
N = 11, 253 and 1447 (cf. Figs 3 and 4).
These numbers correspond to different modes of the game: the random (N = 11
and m = 5) and the herd (N = 253, 1447 and m = 5), according to the terminology
used in ref. [6] for the SMG. Comparing behavior of Ok(t) for different populations
one observes that for large N most agents prefer the same market to act (we call
this market big) and one sees that Ok(t) tends to stabilize fast. There is no such
effect for small N . These observations are robust with respect to small variations
of N . Simulating ensemble of histories we checked that both markets are equally
likely to become big. Another effect, seen only on a big market, is an appearance of
distinct peaks of Ak(t) (Fig. 4, right), comparable in size with the values of Ok(t)
for big market.
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Fig. 3. Time evolution of the market occupancy Ok(t) (black lines correspond to k = 1 and grey
ones to k = 2) in MMG for m = 5 and for three agent populations N = 11 (upper left), 253 (upper
right) and 1447 (bottom). It is seen how the split of the market occupancies increases with N .
In order to study the effect further, consider the following regular game with
large N :
(1) For any given history µ of winning strategies, about half of strategies α suggest
action a = 1 and another half a = −1,
(2) Utilities of strategies are uniformly distributed at initial time.
For such defined MMG we perform 300 steps of evolution and in Fig. 5 we plot
Ok(t), Ak(t) and the number of agents who change the market C(t). Fig. 6 presents
utility evolution for three agents, each of them using two different strategies on two
markets.
Depending on the sign of the payoff (4) associated with the minority decision (2),
the strategy is called good (bad) for the positive (negative) payoff. The probability
of the output of any strategy on the k-th market is the same as for the minority
decision on the k-th market and is equal to 1/2. Thus the probability that an agent
has no good strategies is equal to 1/2s. Subsequently, the probability of having at
least one good strategy is equal to 1− 1/2s. For example, for s = 2 the 75% of the
population, in the limit N →∞, has at least one good strategy on market 1.
Since the Ak(t) fluctuates [2, 11], in both the SMG and MMG, rapid change is
also observed in the utility U(t), according to eqs (4) and (5). If Ak(t1) strongly
fluctuates at time t1, the utility of strategies related to market k is strongly affected.
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Fig. 4. Time evolution of the market demand Ak(t) (black lines correspond to k = 1 and grey ones
to k = 2) in the MMG for m = 5 and for three agent populations N = 11 (upper left), 253 (upper
right) and 1447 (bottom). It is seen how the fluctuations of A2(t) become more distinct for large
N .
This can be seen in Fig. 5 where at t = 7 high value of A2 shows up for the first time.
Consequently, utilities of strategies on market 2 change proportionally to A2(7), as
seen in Figs 6. At t1 + 1, about 1 − 1/2
s of agents have at least one strategy with
high U(t1 + 1) on the market where the fluctuation of A occured first. All these
agents choose this market. As seen in Fig. 5, at t = 8 about 75% of the population
has at least one strategy with high utility on market 2. Only agents with two bad
strategies stay with market 1.
Since large fluctuation Ak(t1) comes after some history µ
C
k = µk(t1), all agents
which have at least one strategy suggesting the same output as the minority action
a∗k(t1) for this history tend to choose the bigger market in the next step. The µ
C
has a non-vanishing probability to reappear at t2 > t1. Consequently, all agents
belonging to bigger market react on the same way and Ak(t2) for this market
deviates maximally, i.e. Ak(t2) = Ok(t2), and no agent on the big market belongs to
the minority. In Fig. 5, the µC2 appears again at t = 47 and A2(47) = O2(47) ≃ 1200.
At t2, all strategies with high U(t2) on bigger market fail and get penalty
−Ak(t2), whereas strategies with low U(t2) are rewarded with Ak(t2). As seen
in Figs 6, a quarter of the population with two high-utility strategies on bigger
market now has two strategies with low utility. This part decides to change the
market. Another quarter of the population with two low-utility strategies now has
November 1, 2018 9:51
8 K. Wawrzyniak and W. Wislicki
Fig. 5. Time evolution of the market occupancy Ok(t) (upper left), aggregated demand Ak(t)
(upper right) (black lines correspond to k = 1 and grey ones to k = 2) and number of agents
changing prefered market C(t) (bottom) in the MMG with N = 1600, s = 2 and m = 5.
two strategies with high U(t) and switches from the smaller market to the bigger
one. Remaining half of the population has one low- and one high-utility strategy.
This group remains in the similar situation and stays on a bigger market, although
the utilities of strategies are swapped. Generally, when µCk appears then about half
of agents changes market but Ok(t) remains constant.
Another important characteristics of fluctuation dynamics is given by the fluc-
tuation frequency. In the asymptotic regime, the frequency of large fluctuations of
Ak on bigger market is equal to
〈ν〉 ∼ 1/2m, for N →∞. (7)
Each history appears, on average, once per 2m times and a large fluctuation of
Ak occurs always after the history µ
C . We checked numerically that simulated
〈ν〉 converges to the asymptotic value (7) when simulation time and N become
large. We also checked that, indeed, simulated histories µ are distributed uniformly
with probabilities p(µ) around 1/2m = 1/32 (m = 5), as seen in Figs 7 (upper).
Contrary to that, for small N some histories may be significantly more frequent
than the others, as seen in Figs 7 (lower). In such a case, the pool of strategies for
the whole population is not large enough, their choice space is restricted and some
histories occur more often. Similar inhomogeneity of p(µ) was observed in case of
the SMG, in somewhat different representation, by the authors of ref. [6].
Interesting is the dynamics of the MMG when approaching its stationary regime.
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Fig. 6. Time evolution of the utility for 4 strategies, for the MMG with N = 1600, s = 2 and
m = 5, for three representative agents: with two high-utility strategies on market 1 at the time
t1 + 1 = 8 (upper left), one high- and one low-utility strategy on market 1 at the time t1 + 1 = 8
(upper right) and two low-utility strategies on market 1 at t1 + 1 = 8 (bottom). Grey lines, thin
and bold, correspond to 2 strategies on market 1 and black ones, thin and bold, on market 2.
In order to illustrate this, we examined the relaxation time of market occupancies.
As seen in Fig. 3 (right), for large population the stationarity of the Ok(t) at levels
N/2s and N(1− 1/2s) is reached after finite time. This time is related to the first
occurence of strong fluctuation of Ak(t), as discussed. Defining τ0 as the time when
Ok(t) enters the ±5% belt around N/2
s or N(1− 1/2s) and stays inside it forever,
we present in Fig. 8 how τ0 depends on the often used variable Q = N/2
m, where
m = 5. Decreasing τ0(N/2
m) is consistent with our observation that for large agent
population the probability of strong fluctuation of demand Ak is more likely. Note
however that τ0 is meaningless for too small N when market occupancies do not
stabilize at their asymptotic levels.
Another interesting feature of the MMG is seen when the asymmetry of choice
is examined as a function of an overall population size N . Figs 9 show dependence
of the mean occupancies and demand variances per capita on Q = N/2m. This
dependence is shown separately for the big and small markets. At Qc ≃ 8 the
qualitative change of behaviour is observed. Below Qc both markets are about
equally populated and have similar variance of Ak, whereas above Qc one of the
markets becomes visibly bigger and has larger variance. Below Qc the population is
too small to generate fluctuation in Ak sufficient to significantly affect utilities and
split the agent set into two unequal groups. Our per capita demand fluctuations
〈A2k〉/〈Ok〉 calculated for the MMG differ from that in the SMG where the quantity
November 1, 2018 9:51
10 K. Wawrzyniak and W. Wislicki
Fig. 7. Probability density p(µ) for simulated histories µ for MMG with N = 1447 and m = 5,
for the small (upper left) and large (upper right) markets, and the same probabilities for N = 11,
for the small (lower left) and large (lower right) markets. The p(µ) was estimated from 5,000 time
steps for each game.
Fig. 8. Relaxation time τ0 of the market occupancy Ok(t) versus N/2
m for m = 5. The τ0 is a
mean from ten games and error bars correspond to one standard deviation.
〈A2〉/N is considered. Our definition of the MMG assures that simplifying MMG
to SMG, which is tantamount to switching to the classical MG, one gets identical
games.
The SMG is known to exhibit three modes of behavior: the random, cooperation
and herd [6]. In the MMG, in addition, the fourth mode can be identified. We call
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N/2m
〈OB〉
〈OS〉
100 101
100
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N/2m
〈A2
B
〉/〈OB〉
〈A2
S
〉/〈OS〉
Fig. 9. Mean occupancies of markets 〈O〉 (left) and variances of per capita demands 〈A2〉/〈O〉
(right) as functions of Q = N/2m, where m = 5 and N is variable. Solid lines correspond to the
small market and dotted lines to the big market. The markets have regular structure. Error bars
correspond to one standard deviation and curves are drawn to guide ones eye.
100 101
102
103
N1/2
m
〈O1〉
〈O2〉
100 101
100
101
N1/2
m
〈A2
1
〉/〈O1〉
〈A2
2
〉/〈O2〉
Fig. 10. Mean occupancies of markets 〈O〉 (left) and variances of per capita demands 〈A2〉/〈O〉
(right) as functions of Q = N1/2m, for variable N1, fixed N2 = 301 and m = 5. Solid lines
correspond to market 1 and dotted lines to market 2. The markets have irregular structure. Error
bars correspond to one standard deviation and curves are drawn to guide ones eye.
this behaviour herd asymmetric, to be distinguished from the herd symmetric where
no market split is observed. In this terminology the values of Q ∈ {0.34, 7.9, 45.2}
chosen for our simulations correspond to the random, herd symmetric and herd
asymmetric modes. Asymmetry appears at the transition point Qc where fluctua-
tions per capita for the small market become lower than for the big market. Using
economic terminology, the small market becomes more efficient than the big one.
We also checked if the asymmetry is present for more than two markets of regular
structure. Considerations similar to discussions of Figs 3, 4 and 5 lead us to the
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asymptotic theoretical formulae for market occupancies. If we order K markets,
beginning from the biggest one, we have
〈Ok〉 = N


1− 1/2s, k = 1
(1 − 1/2s)(1/2s)k−1, 1 < k < K
(1/2s)K−1. k = K
(8)
We verified this result by simulations for three markets (K = 3) and present market
demands and occupancies in Figs 11. Similarly to the K = 2 case, the occupancies
Fig. 11. Time evolution of market demands Ak(t) (left) and occupancies Ok(t) (right) for three
regular markets with N = 3001, s = 2 and m = 5. The lightest grey curves correspond to the
largest market occupantion with the largest demand fluctuations.
stabilize and the largest occupancy corresponds to the market with the largest
demand fluctuations.
5.2. Irregular markets
Consider irregular markets with variable N1 and fixed N2 = 301. One expects that
increasingN1 amplifies the probability of high A1(t) and expects significant increase
of utilities for all strategies on the first market. Further reasoning follows that, for
the regular MMG, high A1(t) has no impact on the market preference of agents
playing on market 1 but seriously affects those on market 2. The mean presence on
market 1 grows indefinitely and is asymptotically linear with N1
〈O1〉 ∼ N1 + (1− 1/2
s)N2 for N1 →∞. (9)
For the mean presence on market 2 there exists the limit
lim
N1→∞
〈O2〉 = N2/2
s. (10)
Fig. 10 presents simulations for mean occupancies and demand variances as func-
tions of Q = N1/2
m. As seen in Fig. 10, when the market 1 grows then the market 2
becomes more efficient. This is understandable because if N2 agents were separated
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then such market would work in the herd mode [6]. Allowing agents to act also on
market 1 spurs some of them to do that. The larger N1, the bigger fraction of N2
prefers market 1 and the smaller fraction of N2 prefers market 2. Consequently,
〈O2〉 converges to the limit (10), equal to 75 for our simulation. Decreasing N2
makes smooth transition of market 2 from the herd mode to the cooperation mode,
reflected in lower per capita fluctuations (cf. Fig. 10).
6. Conclusions and final remarks
We considered the MMG as a natural generalization of the classical MG. Although
each agent has a priori the same probability to play on all markets, after some
time most of them act on this market where relatively high aggregated demand
occurs for the first time. This spontaneous breakdown of choice symmetry depends
on the payoff function g in eqn (4). In particular, for g(x) = x strong fluctuation of
demand significantly affects utilities and the effect is well visible. We checked that
for weaker g(x) the effect if less pronounced and for g(x) = sgn(x) it disappears.
This corroborates our conjecture that in the MMG there may exist markets strongly
attracting clients. How fast it occurs, it depends on the likelihood of strong demand
fluctuation. This reminds the well-known phenomenon on the scale-free networks
where links are absorbed by nodes very inhomogenously and the initial random
inhomogeneity of absorptive power of nodes determines their further imparity in
course of the evolution. This kind of behaviour can be also observed on real financial
markets. Large markets of high liquidity strongly attract agents because they enable
easy conversion of chunks of assets into cash. This constitutes a feedback mechanism
making these markets even more liquid, etc.
In our model of the MMG we pointed out that the effect of symmetry breaking
is visible only for s ≥ 2. However, the mathematical formalism introduced in the
paper is true also for s = 1. As we mentioned in chapter 5, the market occupancies
Ok(t) stabilize at the levels N/2
s and N(1 − 1/2s). Therefore the occupancies are
equal for s = 1 and the effect cannot be observed. This explains why the authors of
ref. [8], using s = 1, did not observe any symmetry breaking in their model.
We found that in the MMG there exists a critical value of N/2m above which
agents behave asymmetrically. In this mode we observe collectivity in their be-
haviour. In particular, there always exists a history µCk for which all agents on big-
ger market react identically. We are aware of similarities of the asymmetric mode to
some mechanisms on real financial markets. The closest real analogy is perhaps fi-
nancial crisis when majority of investors sell an asset. However, there are important
shortcomings of our model with respect to reality, e.g. restriction of collectiveness
to given history µCk . In addition, in reality individuals usually do not continue
their game just after selling an asset but may stay apart for some time. There-
fore adequacy of our MMG to real markets is still limited. We see some promising
extensions of the classical MG which could improve the MMG. Among them are
the grand canonical approach [12], stochastic strategies [13] and categorization of
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investors [14].
Appendix A. The flow chart of the multi-market minority game
simulation
AGENT N:
How should I act?
action
m=2past
winning 
decisions
1(t) on 
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…
…
…
…
..
m=2past
winning 
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-1  1
1  1
-1
1
1
-1
11)(  tU
INPUT OUTPUT
-1 -1
1 -1
-1  1
1  1
1
1
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-1 -1
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-1  1
1  1
3)(  tU
-1
-1
1
-1
s=2 strategies related to market k=1 s=2 strategies related to market k=2
N
?
?
?
n-th AGENT
Fig. 12. The diagram of the MMG simulation for N agents and m = 2 decision record length,
K = 2 markets and s = 2 decisions for each agent and each market.
The diagram in Fig. 12 presents how the MMG is simulated. At any time step
t each of N agents examines the public pattern µk(t) of m most recent winning
decisions on each of K accessible markets (k = 1, . . . ,K, where K = 2 in our
example in Fig. 12). Each agent acts according to its policy encoded in s strategies
per market (s = 2 in Fig. 12). First, an agent chooses a strategy and then acts on
the market assigned to this strategy. At any time one agent acts on one market
only. Subsequently, the aggregate demand Ak(t) and the minority action a
∗
k(t) on
the k-th market are calculated according to the minority rule. The Ak(t) constitutes
a feedback to agents, used by them in the adaptation process. The a∗k(t) is then
concatenated with µk(t) thus producing µk(t+1). The patterns µk(t+1) are analysed
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by agents at t+ 1.
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